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SUPREME COURT PRACfiCE. By Robert L. Stern, 1 Eu-
gene Gressman,2 and Stephen M. Shapiro.3 Washington, 
D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1986. Pp. xlvi, 
1030. $95.00. 
Barry Sullivan 4 
In The Meaning of Treason, Dame Rebecca West describes the 
oral arguments given in the House of Lords in the post-war treason 
trial of William Joyce, a man better known as "Lord Haw Haw," 
the Third Reich's preeminent English-speaking propagandist. 
Dame Rebecca writes: 
There in the House of Lords there was being given a performance far finer than 
the highest level of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal: as far superior to that, 
as that had been superior to the Old Bailey. When these four old Judges had a 
passage with counsel, it was as good as first-class tennis.5 
In Supreme Court advocacy, as in first-class tennis, the outcome of 
the match depends greatly upon the preparation which precedes the 
event. Indeed, it is no mean achievement in Supreme Court prac-
tice merely to assure that the match is scheduled for play, because 
the path to the Supreme Court is beset with traps for the unwary, 
all of which must be successfully navigated if even the most impor-
tant case is to reach the oral argument stage. 6 
For that reason, the authors' goal in Supreme Court Practice is 
the necessarily immodest one of "set[ting] forth in a single volume 
to the extent possible everything that a lawyer would want to know 
as to how to prosecute or defend a case in the Supreme Court." The 
extent to which the authors have met that goal in previous editions 
of this work has long made Supreme Court Practice indispensable to 
I. Member, Illinois bar. 
2. William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
3. Member, Illinois bar. 
4. Member, Illinois bar. In the interest of full disclosure, the author of this review 
wishes to note that he served with Stephen Shapiro in the Office of the Solicitor General from 
March 1980 through December 1981. For the same reason, he also wishes to acknowledge 
that he was personally involved in four of the cases noted or discussed in this essay: Griffith 
v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987); Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986); Shapiro v. 
Drug Enforcement Admin., 721 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1983), vacated, 469 U.S. 14 (1984), on 
remand, 762 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1985); and United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Govs. v. Aikens, 
453 u.s. 902 (1981). 
5. R. WEST, THE MEANING OF TREASON 46 (1947). As the authors of Supreme Court 
Practice note, however, "some members of the Court have voiced increasing disappointment 
at the quality of some of the [oral] arguments that are being made." 
6. See, e.g., Donovan v. Richland County Ass'n, 454 U.S. 389 (1982) (Secretary's ap-
peal dismissed because appeal erroneously taken to court of appeals when Supreme Court had 
exclusive jurisdiction to review judgment entered by district court). 
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lawyers who practice before the Court. Indeed, it should be consid-
ered prima facie evidence of malpractice for any lawyer, no matter 
how experienced, to fail to consult this work when preparing a case 
for submission to the Supreme Court. The new edition, necessitated 
by the Court's wholesale revision of its Rules in 1980,7 and by its 
evolving case law on procedural matters, carries forward that stan-
dard of excellence and indispensability. 
The book contains essential information ranging from such 
practical matters as how to find the Clerk's Office to a rigorous 
scholarly analysis of the Court's certiorari and appellate jurisdic-
tions. Particularly useful discussions concern the pitfalls that must 
be avoided when a case seems to fall within both the certiorari and 
appellate jurisdictions, when a case involves independent state 
grounds, or when opposing counsel has moved for summary affir-
mance. In addition, the book contains excellent discussions of is-
sues hotly debated by the Justices, such as the practice of dissenting 
from denials of certiorari,s the significance that should be attributed 
to denials of certiorari, and the proper standard of poverty to be 
applied in evaluating applications for leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis. Finally, even when a subject does not warrant extensive 
treatment because, as in the case of oral argument, it is not pecu-
liarly a matter of Supreme Court practice, the authors provide ref-
erences to a well-chosen selection of the more general literature. 
In sum, Supreme Court Practice continues to be invaluable. 
Not only is the treatment thorough and the advice sound, but the 
writing is elegant as well. This book easily can be read from cover 
to cover without any sense of boredom or loss of attention. Rather 
than attempting to survey the entire book, I will focus on one issue, 
which, from a practitioner's perspective, is crucial: how to influ-
ence the Court's decision to grant review in a case. 
With respect to the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction, for 
instance, it is well known that the Court does not sit to correct er-
rors. The Court ordinarily will grant review only to resolve a set-
tled pattern of conflict among the courts of appeals on an important 
7. Sup. Ct. R., 445 U.S. 983 (1980). 
8. As the authors point out, Justice Stevens has strongly expressed the view that such 
dissents should be discouraged, particularly because they tend "to compromise the otherwise 
secret deliberations in our Conferences." Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 940, 946 
(1978) (Stevens, J.). Justice Brennan, on the other hand, has taken the view that such dis-
sents serve the useful purpose of "herald[ing] the appearance on the horizon of a possible 
reexamination of what may seem ... to be an established and unimpeachable principle." 
Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 473, 480 
(1973). A particularly interesting pair of opinions on the denial of a petition for a writ of 
certiorari is to be found in McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983). Cf Batson, 106 S.Ct. 
1712 (1986). 
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question of federal law. Indeed, even in cases clearly involving im-
portant questions of federal law, the Court will sometimes permit a 
persistent conflict to remain unresolved for several years, presuma-
bly to permit a fuller development of the law in the lower federal 
courts.9 My impression, like that of the authors, is that the mere 
existence of a conflict does not carry the weight that it once did. 
With the recent, explosive growth in statutory enactments and fed-
eral appellate case law, the Supreme Court seems increasingly will-
ing to tolerate intercircuit conflicts that clearly would have 
warranted review only a few years ago. Thus, the intrinsic impor-
tance of the issue presented has taken on increasing significance in 
the Court's decision-making process. 
Given the staggering volume of petitions and jurisdictional 
statements that are now filed each Term,w the Justices can be ex-
pected to spend no more than an average of five minutes on each set 
of papers. As Justice Harlan once observed, "[f]requently the ques-
tion whether a case is 'certworthy' is more a matter of 'feel' than of 
precisely ascertainable rules."11 Nonetheless, some guidance can be 
gleaned from the Justices' unofficial writings on the subject, which 
the authors thoroughly canvass. In this instance, the fishes talk, 
and only a fool would bait the hook before listening carefully to 
what they have to say. 
In all of this excellent book, there is only one area that might 
profit from greater attention: the special problems presented in liti-
gating against the government at the petition stage. In Supreme 
Court litigation, as elsewhere, the words of the scriptures ring true: 
"For everything there is a season." New Supreme Court decisions 
and new legislation beget further unresolved constitutional and 
legal questions that begin to be litigated in various courts through-
out the country, and then work their way up through the system. 
Because many cases are proceeding to the Supreme Court at various 
speeds along parallel tracks, timing is important.I2 Notwithstand-
9. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (resolving long-standing 
conflict concerning so-called "control group test" for attorney-client privilege). 
10. As the authors correctly note, the raw numbers are somewhat deceptive because the 
vast majority of cases filed in the Court are not even serious contenders for Supreme Court 
review. Justice Brennan has observed that "the Court is unanimously of the view in 70 per-
cent of all docketed cases, that the questions sought to be reviewed do not even merit confer-
ence discussion." Brennan, supra note 8, at 479. 
II. Harlan, Manning the Dikes, 13 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 541, 549 (1958). 
12. The outcome of the race to the Supreme Court may have substantial consequences 
for the particular parties involved. In the past, these consequences have been most dramatic 
where the Court has been asked to articulate a new principle of constitutional criminal proce-
dure, which may or may not be applied to other cases pending on direct appeal at the time the 
new rule is announced. See, e.g., Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 (1985); Mackey v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 
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ing the role of fortuity in this process, the Solicitor General's rate of 
success in securing Supreme Court review continues to be over-
whelming, as the authors note. Because of the large volume of cases 
from which the Solicitor General may pick and choose, and the def-
erence that the Court traditionally has given to the views of the 
Solicitor General, n litigating against the government at the petition 
stage presents some particularly challenging problems. 
Although I have not made any systematic study of these 
problems, I did come face-to-face with them in a case I handled 
three years ago. In early 1984, I was attempting, despite the strong 
opposition of the Solicitor General, to secure Supreme Court review 
for my clients in Shapiro v. Drug Enforcement Administration.l4 
Although the Solicitor General conceded that the issue warranted 
Supreme Court review, he wished to have the issue decided by the 
Court in another case, United States Department of Justice v. 
Provenzano,J5 which he doubtless believed to present the issue in a 
factual context more favorable to the government's position. 
The events leading up to my contest with the Solicitor General 
actually began in late 1981. The Reagan Administration, in a brief 
filed in the District of Columbia Circuit in Greentree v. United 
States Customs Service,l6 altered the government's long-standing lit-
igating position concerning the proper relationship of the Privacy 
ActJ7 and the Freedom of Information Act,Js so as to limit severely 
the disclosure rights of so-called "first-party requesters"-persons 
244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has recently simplified the law 
in this area by repudiating the so-called "clear break" exception to retroactivity. See Griffith, 
107 S.Ct. 708 (1987). In the future, the most serious consequences apparently will befall the 
premature, rather than the tardy, that is, the defendant who files an unsuccessful petition for 
certiorari before the Court is ready to decide the question presented, and who will therefore 
have passed beyond the direct appeal stage at the time the new rule is announced. See Allen 
v. Hardy, 106 S. Ct. 2878 (1986). Given the need for compliance with the Court's jurisdic-
tional time limitations, that is a circumstance over which counsel will have little, if any, 
control in most cases. 
13. See, e.g., Aikens, 453 U.S. at 906 (Marshall, J., dissenting): 
I am at a loss to understand this disposition, as I suspect the Court of Appeals will 
be. Perhaps it reflects the pressures of the end of the Term, or an excessive defer-
ence to the views of the Solicitor General, or a desire for an easy, temporary solu-
tion to a potentially troublesome issue. 
Cf United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Govs. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983). 
14. 721 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1983). 
15. 717 F.2d 799 (3d Cir.), reh. denied, 722 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1983), vacated, 469 U.S. 14 
(1984). A detailed discussion of the legal issue involved in the Shapiro and Provenzano cases 
is not warranted here, but that issue was the subject of contemporaneous comment in numer-
ous legal periodicals. See, e.g., Note, Administrative Law-Privacy Act Exemption (j){2) Does 
Not Specifically Preclude Disclosure of Information Within Meaning of Exemption (3) of the 
Freedom of Information Act, 56 TEMP. L.Q. 127 (1983). 
16. 674 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1980), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
18. 5 U.S.C. § 522a (1980), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
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seeking disclosure of government information about themselves. 
Previously, the government had taken the view that the disclosure 
rights afforded by the two statutes were complementary and cumu-
lative. In late 1981, however, the government adopted the position 
that the Privacy Act was the sole means by which persons could 
secure information about themselves. Hence, they had no right to 
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. Since the Pri-
vacy Act contained exemptions from disclosure that were far 
broader than those contained in the Freedom of Information Act, 
information that was available to third parties under the Freedom 
of Information Act would no longer be available to the subjects 
themselves under the government's new construction of the two 
statutes. 
In March 1982, the District of Columbia Circuit decided the 
Greentree case, rejecting the government's new position in a lengthy 
opinion by Chief Judge Wald.t9 Despite the conflict in the circuits 
created by the decision in Greentree, the government did not file a 
petition for a writ of certiorari. Presumably, the government hoped 
to enhance the likelihood of ultimately prevailing in the Supreme 
Court by convincing another circuit to rule in its favor, but based 
on a more defensible line of legal analysis than that employed in the 
two poorly reasoned cases that already favored the government.2o 
After Greentree, the government therefore continued to deny disclo-
sure to first-party requesters and to litigate the issue in the lower 
federal courts. 
The next relevant development occurred on September 15, 
1983, when the Third Circuit decided two cases in which district 
courts in New Jersey and Pennsylvania had upheld the govern-
ment's new position. In Porter v. United States Department of Jus-
tice,zt which the Third Circuit treated as the lead case, the plaintiffs 
were a professor at Bryn Mawr College, and her husband, both of 
whom had been targets of FBI surveillance because of their political 
activities. They were represented by Raymond J. Bradley, a leading 
Philadelphia lawyer and a partner in the firm of Wolf, Block, 
Schorr & Solis-Cohen. In a lengthy and well-reasoned opinion, the 
Third Circuit panel unanimously rejected the government's new po-
sition and decided to stand with the District of Columbia Circuit. 
The government neither petitioned for rehearing nor filed a petition 
for a writ of certiorari in Porter. 
19. Greentree, 674 F.2d at 88-89. 
20. Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); 
Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1980). 
21. 717 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1983). 
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In the companion case, Provenzano v. United States Depart-
ment of Justice,zz which had been argued orally in tandem with 
Porter, the plaintiff was a federal prisoner and reputedly a high-
ranking New Jersey mobster. He was represented by Harvey 
Weissbard, who practiced with a two-person law firm in West Or-
ange, New Jersey. The Third Circuit panel rested on its opinion in 
Porter and disposed of the Provenzano case in a per curiam opinion 
which covers less than half a page in the Federal Reporter. 
The government decided to petition for rehearing en bane only 
in Provenzano. Obviously, the government believed that the 
Provenzano facts were stronger. In addition, by jettisoning the 
Porter case, the government was also ridding itself of a formidable 
adversary in the person of Mr. Bradley. 
The government's strategy was not successful with the en bane 
court, which denied the petition for rehearing on November 10, 
1983, by a vote of seven to four.23 However, Judge Adams, in his 
dissent from the denial of rehearing en bane, ran with the govern-
ment's ball. He criticized the court for requiring FBI records to be 
turned over to "Anthony Provenzano, who has a host of serious 
convictions on his record and who admittedly has been involved in 
organized crime."24 Presumably, Judge Adams's rhetoric would 
have been different if he had had to deal with Professor Porter's 
case as well as Mr. Provenzano's. 
On September 16, 1983, the day following the announcement 
of the Third Circuit's panel opinions in Porter and Provenzano, the 
Seventh Circuit heard oral argument in Shapiro v. Drug Enforce-
ment Administration.zs The plaintiffs, Gregory Wentz and Alfred 
Shapiro, had been convicted of federal drug offenses, but neither of 
them had an extensive criminal record. I represented Mr. Shapiro 
and Mr. Wentz as court-appointed counsel. 
On November 16, 1983, six days after the Third Circuit had 
denied the government's petition for rehearing in Provenzano, the 
Seventh Circuit ruled against us, rejecting the reasoning in Green-
tree and Porter, and reaffirming a prior Seventh Circuit holding. 
At that point, the race was on. It seemed to me a virtual cer-
tainty that certiorari would be granted in either Provenzano or Sha-
piro, while the other case would probably be held on the Court's 
docket for later summary disposition. Needless to say, I hoped that 
Shapiro would be the case chosen for plenary review. Objectively, 
22. 717 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1983). 
23. Provenzano, 722 F.2d at 36. 
24. /d. 
25. 721 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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my clients were more attractive plaintiffs than Mr. Provenzano. In 
addition, the issue presented involved extremely complex questions 
of statutory construction. The resources of a large firm would be 
useful in preparing the case. From a subjective standpoint, my cli-
ents obviously did not relish the possibility of having their fates de-
cided in a case in which they were not parties. The government, as 
soon became obvious, desperately wanted the Supreme Court to de-
cide the issue only in the context of Mr. Provenzano's case.26 
Prior to filing a petition for a writ of certiorari, a number of 
recommendations generally are assembled and reviewed by the So-
licitor General and his staff. The government's decision to seek 
Supreme Court review is a bureaucratic decision which ordinarily 
requires time. Thus, despite the fact that the Third Circuit's denial 
of rehearing en bane had been issued six days before the Seventh 
Circuit's decision in Shapiro, it seemed likely that we could get our 
petition on file first. If that happened, we thought that the Court 
might grant our petition and hold Provenzano, or, at least, grant the 
petitions in both cases and consolidate them for oral argument. 
On December 6, 1983, we filed our petition for a writ of certio-
rari in Shapiro. Nine days later, on December 15, I wrote to the 
Solicitor General to suggest that the government acquiesce in the 
granting of certiorari in Shapiro. On December 27, an assistant to 
the Solicitor General responded to my letter. He stated: 
We agree that there is a clear conflict among the circuits on the question whether 
the Privacy Act is an Exemption 3 statute and that the question deserves Supreme 
Court resolution. The Solicitor General therefore has authorized the filing of a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari in Provenzano (a copy of that petition is enclosed). We 
also are currently considering the appropriate response to the Shapiro petition and 
expect to file it shortly.27 
Acting with exceptional speed, the government had filed its pe-
tition in Provenzano four days earlier, on December 23. In January, 
Mr. Provenzano waived the right to file a response, but the Court 
subsequently ordered that a response be filed by March 1, 1984. 
In the meantime, and contrary to the Solicitor General's letter 
of December 27, the government decided to delay filing its response 
to the Shapiro petition. On January 4, 1984, the Solicitor General 
requested a thirty-day extension of time to file his brief in opposi-
tion. This extension was necessary, the Solicitor General asserted, 
26. At some point, the Civil Division attorney handling both cases suggested that I 
disqualify myself from representing Mr. Shapiro and Mr. Wentz because of my prior employ-
ment with the Department of Justice. Since there was no statutory or ethical ground for 
disqualification, I refused to do so, and the suggestion was thereafter dropped. 
27. Letter from Elliott Schulder, Assistant to the Solicitor General to Barry Sullivan 
(Dec. 27, 1983). 
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"because government counsel with primary responsibility for pre-
paring the government's response have been occupied with prepar-
ing other previously assigned matters. "2s As with virtually all first 
requests for an extension of time in which to file a brief in opposi-
tion, the government's application was granted. 
On February 3, the government requested a second extension 
of time to March 9, this time "because the nature of our response in 
this case may depend on the substance of the response to our peti-
tion in Provenzano,"29 the latter being due for filing on March 1. 
The government's second application was also granted. 
When, on March 9, the Solicitor General finally filed his three-
page response to the petition in Shapiro, he recited the procedural 
history of the case in the lower courts, restated the question 
presented, and then stated: 
We agree with petitioners that this question, as to which there is a conflict among 
the circuits, warrants review by this Court. We therefore have filed a petition for a 
writ of certiorari seeking review of this question in United States Department of 
Justice v. Provenzano, No. 83-1045. Accordingly, we suggest that the Court defer 
disposition of the instant petition pending its disposition of our petition in 
Provenzano.30 
Since there was no obvious or compelling reason for the Court 
to defer to the government's request that plenary review by granted 
in Provenzano, rather than in Shapiro (which had been filed first), 
the Solicitor General suggested in a footnote that "there is some 
question whether one of [the two] petitioners is entitled to proceed 
in forma pauperis," and that "[a]ny uncertainty regarding [his] right 
to proceed in forma pauperis should be clarified while the issue com-
mon to these cases is resolved in Provenzano."JI There was in fact 
little, if any, good faith basis for questioning Mr. Shapiro's entitle-
ment to proceed in forma pauperis, but the government's ploy was a 
good one in view of the Supreme Court's then-recent expressions of 
concern about parties who had improperly sought to proceed as 
paupers.32 
We deemed it necessary to file a speedy and hard-hitting reply, 
which we did three days later. With respect to the government's in 
forma pauperis argument, we made two points. First, we pointed 
28. Letter from Hon. Rex E. Lee, Solicitor General of the United States to Hon. Alex-
ander Stevas, Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States (Jan. 4, 1984). 
29. Letter from Hon. Rex E. Lee, Solicitor General of the United States to Hon. Alex-
ander Stevas, Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 3, 1984). 
30. Memorandum for the Respondent at 2-3 (No. 83-5878) (filed March 9, 1984) (foot-
notes omitted). 
31. Jd. at 3 n.2. 
32. See, e.g., Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U.S. 928 (1983); Garcia v. United States, 462 
u.s. 1116 (1983). 
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out that the government had raised no question with respect to Mr. 
Wentz's entitlement to proceed in forma pauperis.33 We then noted 
that Mr. Shapiro's affidavit established that his total assets, at the 
time the petition was filed, consisted of $314. We argued: "It is 
manifest that Mr. Shapiro, who had only recently been released 
from custody [when the petition was filed], could not have paid for 
the printing of his petition, let alone the docketing fee."34 
Second, we questioned why the government had delayed in 
raising the issue until after the petition in Provenzano had been fully 
briefed and was ready for conference. We noted that the govern-
ment had offered no explanation as to "why it was necessary to take 
90 days to raise this question [of Mr. Shapiro's entitlement to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis], which is admittedly the only issue raised in 
its memorandum."3s We also noted that although petitioners' 
counsel "has had several telephone conversations with government 
counsel [in the ninety days following the filing of the petition in 
Shapiro], the alleged issue of Mr. Shapiro's entitlement to proceed 
in forma pauperis has never been raised prior to the filing of the 
government's memorandum. "36 
On March 13, I telephoned the Clerk's Office to find out 
whether the petitions in Provenzano and Shapiro had been sched-
uled for conference.37 I then learned that the government's strategy 
had worked. The Chief Deputy Clerk told me that Provenzano had 
33. Petitioners' Reply Memorandum at 2-3 (No. 83-5878) (filed March 12, 1984). We 
also argued: "While asking that the Court give preference to the government's petition in 
Provenzano, the Solicitor General does not point to a single substantive or procedural differ-
ence between the two cases to suggest that Provenzano might be a better vehicle for Supreme 
Court review." /d. at 2. 
34. /d. at 3 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, we further developed the point: 
The government asserts ... that Mr. Shapiro should not be allowed to proceed in 
forma pauperis because he currently earns $1500 per month. To make this gross 
monthly income sound more substantial, the government assumes that Mr. Shapiro 
will continue to be employed at this amount, and thus states that Mr. Shapiro earns 
$18,000 per year. Even assuming Mr. Shapiro's continued employment and salary, 
the import of the government's argument is that Mr. Shapiro--who is being repre-
sented by court-appointed counsel, has virtually no assets, and has two children to 
support-should not be allowed to vindicate his rights unless he is willing to devote 
an amount equal to perhaps two or three months' gross income to the payment of 
the costs that would necessarily be incurred in the printing of briefs in this case. 
How Mr. Shapiro, with virtually no assets to begin with, is to accumulate that sur-
plus in time to pay his printing bills is a question that remains unanswered in the 
government's footnote. 
/d. at 3 n.2. 
35. /d. at 3 (footnote omitted). 
36. /d. at 3 n.3. 
37. Although parties are not notified that their case has been scheduled for conference, 
the Clerk's Office will provide that information when requested by telephone. In circum-
stances such as those described here, that information may be very useful and obviously 
should be requested. 
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been scheduled for conference on Friday, March 23, but that no 
conference date had been set in Shapiro. I attempted to explain the 
circumstances to the Chief Deputy Clerk, but he told me that there 
was nothing he or I could do. I decided to write a letter to the 
Clerk of the Court, which I sent by messenger that evening. In my 
letter, a copy of which was sent to the Solicitor General, I stated the 
following: 
In his request for a second extension of time, the Solicitor General stated that 
the captioned matter "would not be scheduled for argument this Term in any 
event," thus suggesting that petitioners in the captioned matter would not be 
prejudiced by the granting of his request. It now appears, however, that petitioners 
have indeed been prejudiced in that the granting of the Solicitor General's request 
has delayed the scheduling of the conference in the captioned matter (and has effec-
tively reversed the filing order of the two cases), since the Provenzano case appears 
to be scheduled for conference on March 23, whereas the captioned matter has not 
yet been scheduled for conference.38 
After stating my concern that these developments might well pre-
clude Mr. Wentz and Mr. Shapiro from presenting their arguments 
to the Court, I suggested that, "as a matter of judicial economy, it 
seems highly desirable that two cases involving identical issues 
should be considered together at the same conference, so that the 
Court may decide whether to grant one or both of the petitions with 
the full benefit of both sets of briefs."J9 
When I telephoned the Clerk's office two days later, I was ad-
vised that the Clerk had circulated my letter to the Justices. On 
March 26, when the Court announced the actions taken at its 
March 23 conference, the conference at which the Provenzano case 
was to have been discussed, I learned that no action had been taken 
in either case. On April 2, orders were entered granting both peti-
tions, consolidating the cases for oral argument, and granting the 
applications of both Mr. Shapiro and Mr. Wentz for leave to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis. 40 
As this all-too-protracted illustration may suggest, there are 
38. Letter from Barry Sullivan to Hon. Alexander Stevas, Clerk, Supreme Court of the 
United States, (Mar. 13, 1984). 
39. /d. 
40. 466 U.S. 926 (1984). Eventually, both cases became moot. See United States De-
partment of Justice v. Provenzano, 469 U.S. 14 (1984), when Congress, shortly before the 
cases were to be argued orally, enacted a "clarifying amendment" to the Privacy Act, provid-
ing that "[n]o agency shall rely on any exemption in this section to withhold from an individ-
ual any record which is otherwise accessible to such individual under the provisions of section 
552 of this title." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(q)(2) (Supp. III 1985). The purpose of this clarifying 
amendment, which confirmed the correctness of the Porter and Green tree decisions, was "spe-
cifically [to] reject[] the interpretation set forth in the decisions of the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits" and "to clarify and restore the law on this point." H.R. Rep. No. 98-726, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 14 (1984). 
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some telling points to be made about litigating against the govern-
ment at the petition stage. First, the government has a great deal of 
capital with the Court. Because of the Solicitor General's tradi-
tional role as counsel, not just for a client agency, but for the United 
States itself,4I the Solicitor General's views carry a great deal of 
weight with the Court. Indeed, who but the Solicitor General 
would have dared to suggest to the Supreme Court that review 
should be granted in Provenzano, and not in Shapiro, on grounds 
which amounted to nothing more than a naked, unexplained prefer-
ence for the Provenzano case? Second, the Solicitor General is not 
at all shy in trading on his capital with the Court if that will assist 
him in achieving the government's tactical goals. In the Shapiro 
case, the Solicitor General clearly was using his special relationship 
with the Supreme Court to manipulate the Justices into taking the 
course which he preferred. Third, the government can be stopped 
in its tracks. The Court can be persuaded that the government is 
abusing its trust. 
I do not mean to pass judgment on the ethical questions raised 
by this illustration but I do suggest that they require a great deal of 
expertise and tenacity on the part of counsel litigating against the 
government at the petition stage. The account I have given is neces-
sarily anecdotal, rather than systematic. However, I do believe that 
this account gives some sense of the practical problems typically 
faced by private counsel. 
With their knowledge and experience, the authors' views on 
this subject would undoubtedly be of great assistance to the practic-
ing bar. In suggesting that this subject may be an appropriate one 
for inclusion in future editions of Supreme Court Practice, a sugges-
tion which is admittedly a minor one (particularly when viewed 
against the grandeur of the authors' overall accomplishment), I 
mean to suggest only a small area of improvement in an already 
exceptional and indispensable work. Suffice it to say that my admi-
ration for the current edition is great and unqualified. 
41. See, e.g., Griswold, The Office of the Solicitor General-Representing the Interests of 
the United States Before the Supreme Court, 34 Mo. L. REV. 527 (1969); McCree, The Solici-
tor General and His Client, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 337 (1981). 
